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We review the distinction between sense of agency and sense of ownership, and then
explore these concepts, and their reflective attributions, in schizophrenic symptoms
and agoraphobia. We show how the underlying dynamics of these experiences are
different across these disorders. We argue that these concepts are complex and cannot
be reduced to neural mechanisms, but involve embodied and situated processes that
include the physical and social environments. We conclude by arguing that the subjective
and intersubjective dimensions of agency and ownership cannot be considered in
isolation from one another, but instead form an interdependent pairing.
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INTRODUCTION
The sense of agency (SA) may be considered an experiential aspect of the embodied nature of
self. One way to grasp the role played by SA is to situate it within the context of anomalous
bodily experiences. Research on this theme has focused especially on cases of schizophrenia and
depersonalization (e.g., Gallagher, 2005; David et al., 2008; Jeannerod, 2009; Sierra, 2009). In
cases of schizophrenic delusions of control, according to some accounts, the sense of self-agency
is disrupted; the patient at times experiences her thoughts, actions, and bodily movements as
controlled by another agent. Importantly, the disruption of SA occurs not simply in an intra-
psychic manner, even in the case of thought insertion, but involves relations to others and the
world more broadly (Gallagher, 2012).
Alongside schizophrenia, agoraphobic anxiety offers another way in which disruptions in the
experience of agency reveal the dynamic and relational structure of this phenomenon1. There are at
least two points to consider. First, in terms of first-person experience, subjects with phobic anxiety
tend to mistrust their own response to the world, feeling their bodies could give way at any point,
thus positioning the locus of control outside of selfhood. Second, in cases of agoraphobic anxiety,
loss of SA leads to a partial loss of the sense of bodily ownership. This can also be understood in
the context of intersubjective relations. For the agoraphobic person, the encroachment of other
1We limit our discussion of anxiety to agoraphobia; this is a result of constraints of space and thematic scope. No doubt, social
anxiety, and generalized anxiety each involve a specific and complex conceptualization of SA and ownership. Such anxieties
are likely to have overlaps with that of agoraphobia, but nevertheless merit a separate investigation.
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people into one’s own space leads to anxiety, generating an
experience of the body as both my own and not my own
concurrently (Trigg, 2013a).
In this paper, after reviewing the distinction between SA
and sense of ownership (SO), we explore these notions, and
their reflective attributions, in schizophrenic symptoms and in
agoraphobia. We show how the underlying dynamics of these
experiences are different across these conditions. We conclude
by arguing that the subjective and intersubjective dimensions of
agency and ownership cannot be considered in isolation from one
another, but instead form an interdependent pairing.
SENSE OF AGENCY AND SENSE OF
OWNERSHIP
A number of theorists have defended clear phenomenological
distinctions between experiences of agency and ownership
(Graham and Stephens, 1994; Gallagher, 2000a,b, 2012; Stephens
and Graham, 2000; Tsakiris et al., 2007; Synofzik et al., 2008).
These distinctions have been made in regard to both pre-
reflective and reflective consciousness. On the pre-reflective level
of experience, SA is the sense that I originate and control my
actions; SO is the sense that I am the one who is moving
or undergoing an experience (Gallagher, 2000a). The case of
involuntary action makes the distinction clear. For example, if
someone pushes me from behind, my experience is that I am the
one moving (I have SO for my bodily movement), but, at least
in the first instant, I do not have SA for the movement since I
was not the one who initiated the action. The phenomenological
claim is that SA and SO are common features intrinsic to most
pre-reflective agentive experience. This applies to thinking as
well, insofar as thinking is considered to be an action.
Experimental studies have attempted to identify the neural
correlates of SA and SO, which are thought to involve
correlations between efferent signals (for SA) and afferent signals
(for SO) (e.g., Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005), and may involve
sensory integration in the anterior insula (e.g., Farrer and Frith,
2002). In a more recent study Tsakiris et al. (2010) found
independent activations in midline cortical structures associated
with SO, absent for SA; and activation in the pre-SMA linked
to SA, but absent for SO. Although this finding supports an
“independence” model, where SA and SO are understood to be
two “qualitatively different experiences, triggered by different
inputs, and recruiting distinct brain networks” (Ibid, 2740),
there is behavioral and phenomenological evidence for a more
integrative or “additive” model where SA and SO are strongly
related (e.g., Caspar et al., 2015).
In addition to pre-reflective SA and SO, Stephens and
Graham (2000) have proposed that one can attribute agency and
ownership retrospectively based on a judgment of consistency
between one’s actions (or thoughts or beliefs) and one’s self-
narrative. They distinguish between the reflective attribution
of agency (AA) and the reflective attribution of subjectivity or
ownership (AO). They argue that with respect to agency, if an
action I perform or a thought that I have are inconsistent with
how I understand myself, my introspective sense that I am the
agent may be less than if that action or thought is consistent with
my self-understanding.
As Synofzik et al. (2008) indicate, AA and AO involve
judgments of agency and ownership, the result of a second-
order reflective consciousness, as distinct from a first-order pre-
reflective experience of SA and SO. Graham and Stephens suggest
that AA involves a process of comparing action (or belief) and
narrative to test for consistency. It seems possible, however, that a
second-order retrospective judgment about agency may be based
directly on the first-order experience of SA (Bayne and Pacherie,
2007; Haggard and Tsakiris, 2009). That is, if I am asked whether
I have engaged in a particular action, my reflective stance may
simply discover that my pre-reflective experience of that action
already involved SA. In that case AA may simply be a report on
SA rather than a comparative judgment about one’s action and
one’s self-narrative.
The phenomenological claim that SA and SO are common
features intrinsic to most pre-reflective agentive experience has
not gone unchallenged, however. Bermúdez (2011), for example,
despite his contention that first-person bodily experience counts
as a form of self-consciousness, argues that there is no
evidence that SO is a feature of pre-reflective experience; he
considers the SO to be a product of reflective judgment,
which would make it equivalent to AO. Bermúdez interprets
claims about SO to be claims about an aspect of experience
separate and distinct from proprioception, kinaesthesia and
other bodily sensations, and he denies that there is any
such aspect. In contrast, we understand SO to be an
implicit aspect of proprioception and other bodily sensations,
rather than something separate from them (Gallagher, 2005;
also see de Vignemont, 2007, 2013). In fact, this implicit
self-experience (or ipseity) is precisely what makes first-person
bodily (proprioceptive, kinaesthetic) awareness itself (i.e., prior
to any judgment) a form of self-consciousness—it’s what puts
the “proprio” in proprioception. On this view such experiences
are characterized by a “perspectival” SO (Albahari, 2006), i.e., an
intrinsic SO directly tied to a first-person perspective.
With respect to SA, Grünbaum (2015) offers a more
detailed critique that draws a conclusion similar and parallel to
Bermúdez’s conclusion about SO, namely that there is no separate
and distinct pre-reflective SA that acts as the basis for a judgment
about agency (AA). Grünbaum focuses on the particular account
of SA that considers it the product of comparator mechanisms
involved in motor control. He doesn’t deny that a comparator
mechanism may be involved in motor control, but he challenges
the idea that comparator processes generate a distinct experience
of agency. He views the claim that SA is generated by such
mechanisms to mean that SA is intention-free. By “intention-
free” we take him to mean that, on such accounts, SA is generated
even if the agent has not formulated a prior, personal-level
intention to act in a certain way. Reaching for my cup of tea
as I work on my computer does not require that I consciously
deliberate and form a plan to do so. Still, it counts as an
intentional action and may involve a present intention-in-action,
and motor intentions (Pacherie, 2006, 2008). Moreover, at least
some comparator models include the idea that there is some
functional element in the system that counts as an intention, and
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that this intention is compared to efference copy or sensory input
from the movement to facilitate motor control (e.g., Frith, 1992;
Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001). In this respect it’s not clear that SA
can be characterized as intention-free.
Grünbaum also points to an important qualification involved
in a number of experiments on SA. For example, in an action-
recognition experiment, Daprati et al. (1997) ask subjects to
perform a hand movement and monitor it on a computer
screen, which shows either their own hand movement, or a
hand movement made by someone else. They are then asked
whether what they saw was their action or not. Typically subjects
mistook the actions of the other’s hand as their own in about
30% of the cases; schizophrenic subjects who had a history of
delusions of control and/or hallucinations misjudged 50–77%
of the cases. The problem, as Grünbaum notes, is that on each
trial the subject is in fact engaging in the action of moving
his own hand. The same objection can be raised in regard to
other experiments. For example, Farrer and Frith (2002) use
a similar experimental design and claim that this allows for
the dissociation between SO and SA. SO for the movement,
they contend, was kept constant because the subject moved on
each trial; but SA varied depending on whether subjects felt
they were in control of what was happening on the computer
screen.
With respect to the Daprati et al. experiment, Grünbaum
concludes that rather than reporting SA based on comparator
processes (since hypothetically that would also remain constant
across all trials), subjects were simply reporting differences
in what they were monitoring on the screen. An alternative
conclusion, however, is that the pre-reflective SA ismore complex
than an experience that is generated by comparator processes.
The idea that SA involves at least two aspects—one having to do
with the control of bodily movement in action, and one having
to do with the intentional aspect of the action, i.e., what the
action accomplishes in the world—has been either assumed (as in
Farrer and Frith, 2002) or explicitly stated (Gallagher, 2005, 2012;
Haggard, 2005). Even if Grünbaum were right about comparator
mechanisms not generating SA, SA may still be generated in our
perceptual monitoring of what our actions are accomplishing
in the world. Langland-Hassan (2008) raises similar worries
about the positive phenomenology of SA, but concludes that the
phenomenology of agency is “one that is embedded in all first
order sensory and proprioceptive phenomenology as diachronic,
action-sensitive patterns of information; it does not stand apart
from them as an inscrutable emotion” (p. 392).
Although we cannot respond to all of Grünbaum’s detailed
arguments here, we do want to indicate that we take SA to be
a more complex phenomenon than just a simple phenomenal
experience generated by a subpersonal comparator mechanism.
Indeed, there are reasons to question whether comparator
models of motor control offer the best explanation (see, e.g.,
Synofzik et al., 2008; Friston, 2011). That issue aside, however,
the pre-reflective SA may be constituted by a number of
contributories, including reflective processes that involve prior
or distal intentions, long-term intentions, and retrospective
attribution (Pacherie, 2006, 2008; Gallagher, 2012; Vinding et al.,
2013).
It may sound strange to suggest that reflective processes
that involve prior intention formation may contribute to a pre-
reflective experience of agency. The idea is simply that if I
deliberate and create an action plan or prior intention to do
something (for example, to buy a new car next week), when
the time comes and I put that intention into action, the fact
that I had planned it out and am not acting in a completely
spontaneous way should enhance my sense of control over my
action. If, in contrast, I found myself in the car dealership due to
a spontaneous desire for a red Mustang convertible that I spotted
on the lot, I might in fact feel a little out of control, and this
feeling of lack of control (or decreased SA) may be reinforced
when I start to evaluate my action in terms of my self-narrative
or in terms of a violation of my long-term intention to reduce my
dependency on fossil fuels. In this respect, a lack of deliberative
reflection or a modulation in AA, the judgment or AA that I
make about my action, may in fact have an effect on my ongoing
pre-reflective SA for the action2.
On this view we can identify several different contributories to
a complex SA connected with any particular action, and we can
think of these contributories as forming a dynamical, relational
gestalt of factors, changes in any one of which can modulate the
experience of SA.
• Formation of prior intentions, often involving a prospective
reflective deliberation or planning that precedes some actions.
• Pre-reflective perceptual monitoring of the effect of my action
on the world in terms of specific intentional or means-ends
relations in specific situations.
• Basic efferent motor-control processes that generate a first-
order experience linked to bodily movement in and toward an
environment.
• The retrospective AA that follows action.
We want to go even further in identifying contributories to
SA, although we won’t be able to lay out the entire argument
here. We contend that the experience of agency is not reducible
to neural comparator mechanisms, even if these mechanisms
are involved in motor control, or even to the purely internal
processes described above. Rather, we suggest that agency, and
the SA that accompanies it, are fully embodied and situated
(Buhrmann and Di Paolo, 2015). That it is embodied should be
obvious since it involves bodily action, the peripheral nervous
system (proprioception, kinaesthesia), autonomic and vestibular
processes, affective and emotional aspects3 and so on (and
on embodied cognition views, even thinking involves bodily
processes). That it is situated means that our agency, and our
experience of it, can be modulated—increased or decreased—
by physical and spatial features of environments as well as
social environments that include, not only other people, but also
normative, social, and institutional practices (Gallagher, 2012,
2014). Consider that even large social structures (e.g., institutions
of apartheid and slavery) can literally rob individuals of their
agency and make them feel that they have no control over
2We’re assuming that neither the action nor SA is a momentary phenomenon but
extends over time.
3Christensen et al. (2016) have shown that fear and anger can reduce an implicit
measure (action binding) for SA.
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their own lives (Gallagher, 2011, 2012). Just as spontaneous
decisions (e.g., the lack of reflective deliberation, as in the case of
spontaneously deciding to buy a car) can diminish one’s feeling
of self-control and SA as one engages in a particular action, so
also a social structure (or intersubjective relation) that takes away
the possibility of making one’s own decision can have an effect on
one’s agentive experience in so far as actionsmay be prevented (by
psychologically undermining motivation) or forced (by physical
discipline)4.
If SA may be modulated by changes in varied factors that
involve, most centrally, pre-reflective perceptual monitoring of
the effects of action, and basic motor-control processes, but also
reflective deliberation, retrospective judgments, environmental,
intersubjective, socio-normative, and even cultural and political
arrangements, then a disruption in any of these factors may
generate nuanced and in some cases, pathological differences in
SA of different sorts [as well as in SO, and the attributions of
agency (AA) and ownership (AO) in so far as these are related
to SA]. That is, we should expect that in different pathologies,
SA may be changed or undermined in different ways, depending
on what factors may be involved. Accordingly, we turn now to
examine changes in SA in two different disorders, schizophrenia
and agoraphobia, to discover both what is common and what is
different in these disorders with respect to SA.
DELUSIONS OF CONTROL IN
SCHIZOPHRENIA
In typical cases of involuntary movement, efferent signals are
missing and, in some situations, so is SA; but SO for the
movement is maintained because of the presence of afferent
sensory feedback. In such cases, my experience is that I am
moving, but I did not initiate the movement. The same logic may
explain some aspects of schizophrenic delusions of control. If
there are neurological problems with efference copy (understood
as a signal sent to a forward comparator involved in motor
control) it may result in a loss of SA for the action (Frith,
1992). Consider the following report by a patient suffering from
delusions of control.
They inserted a computer in my brain. It makes me turn to the
left or right. It’s just as if I were being steered around, by whom or
what I don’t know. (Cited in Frith et al., 2000, p. 358).
The patient expresses no question about who is being turned
or steered (he has an intact SO—it is he who is moving); but
his experience is of something (or someone) else controlling
his movement (he has no SA or sense of self-agency for that
movement). This suggests a bottom-up, empiricist account of one
aspect involved in delusions of control; something goes wrong
at a neural level that has an anomalous effect at the level of
awareness.
With respect to the schizophrenic symptom of thought
insertion, however, it’s not clear that (or how) efference or
a comparator model could be involved in thinking, and
4A study by Caspar et al. (2016), for example, shows that SA, measured by implicit
intentional binding, decreases when agents act under orders.
accordingly, it’s not clear that thought insertion can be explained
in the same way as delusions that involve bodily movement
(Gallagher, 2004). There may be a more general or basic
disruption of neuronal processes that affect not just SA for motor
action, but also for cognitive processes, resulting in symptoms
of thought insertion. SA for higher-order cognitive processes
may depend on the anticipatory aspect of working memory
(Gallagher, 2000b, 2004), something that may also malfunction
in schizophrenic subjects with delusions of control (see Singh
et al., 1992; Daprati et al., 1997; Vogeley et al., 1999). Moreover,
as we indicated in the previous section, multiple factors may be
involved in generating and maintaining SA, and some of these
may still remain in effect.
In addition, the absence of efference copy does not explain
the full phenomenon of delusions of control since the anomalous
experience may also feel alien and there is usually an AA to
another person or object. Billon and Kriegel (2014) suggest that
rather than there being “something missing” (i.e., SA), delusions
of control and thought insertion really involve “something
added”—namely a phenomenology of alienation, which is
reflected in the subject’s claim that someone or something else
is making his thoughts. One possible explanation for the alien
feeling is that a disruption in the integration of somatosensory
signals, visual and auditory signals, and efference (corollary
discharge), or some other kind of malfunction in the anterior
insula or the right inferior parietal cortex (Farrer and Frith, 2002),
or in mechanisms that allows for the proper discrimination
between self and non-self (Georgieff and Jeannerod, 1998), may
generate a sense of alien control at the level of first-order
experience (de Vignemont and Fourneret, 2004; Gallagher, 2004;
Pacherie et al., 2006).
On phenomenological approaches to schizophrenia, delusions
of control are considered disorders of basic self-experiences.
Parnas and Sass (2011) refer to this as a form of ipseity-
disturbance. Ipseity “refers to the most basic sense of selfhood
or self-presence: A crucial sense of self-sameness, fundamental
(thus nearly indescribable) sense of existing as a vital and self-
identical subject of experience or agent of action” (Sass, 2014,
p. 6). Sass, for example, argues that in cases of ipseity disturbance
in schizophrenia, first-person experience is disrupted in two
central ways. First, the patient engages in “hyper-reflexivity,”
which is marked by an amplified self-consciousness of processes
and phenomena that would normally be tacit, or “inhabited” as
part of oneself (Sass, 2014, p. 6). Such self-consciousness, Sass
notes, is neither introspective nor reflective in nature, but instead
functions in a perception-like way. Second, a “diminished self-
affection” emerges, such that the patient undergoes a diminished
“sense of existing as a subject of awareness or agent of action”
(p. 6) and a feeling of alienation. According to this model,
an initial heightened self-awareness leads to a diminished self-
awareness and alien feeling, similar to the way in which if
you stare at the back of your hand long enough it starts to
feel as if you are staring at something that is not you5. The
5It may be that in delusions of control the schizophrenic starts to experience
what Merleau-Ponty has called the impersonal that subtends our personal life:
“if I wanted to express perceptual experience with precision, I would have to say
that one perceives in me, and not that I perceive. Every sensation includes a seed
of dream or depersonalization, as we experience through this sort of stupor into
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ipseity-disturbance model is grounded in the broader distinction
between a minimal or prereflective sense of self-experience
and a second-order, reflective level involving the narrative of
autobiographical self (Sass, 2014, p. 7; Gallagher, 2011). The
disturbance at stake in schizophrenia is a disturbance leveled
precisely at the prereflective or minimal self, rather than the
narrative self (Parnas and Sass, 2011). What is at stake, therefore,
are the experiential aspects of SA and SO.
In contrast to empiricist and phenomenological explanations,
Graham and Stephens (1994) and Stephens and Graham (2000)
propose that in cases of schizophrenic delusions of control or
thought insertion the problem is with AA. The subject fails
to attribute agency to his actions or thoughts because they
seem radically inconsistent with his self-narrative. In such cases
the important change is in the reflective judgment of agency.
According to Graham and Stephens, there is no change in AO,
however; the subject does not deny that the action is being
carried out by his own bodily movement, or that the thought
is occurring as part of his own experience. Indeed, that is
precisely his complaint—that this action or thought involves
his body or his thinking, but does not seem consistent with
his beliefs or self-conceptions. Again, although this top-down,
rationalist account may be more consistent with the view that
a delusion is “a false belief based on incorrect inference” (as
it had been controversially defined by the DSM-4), it doesn’t
provide a full explanation since it’s not clear why an inconsistency
between action and narrative would prevent an attribution of
self-agency rather than, for example, a sense that one has made
a mistake or was simply inconsistent in one’s actions, or why
it would motivate a misattribution of agency to someone else.
In addition, top-down accounts don’t address a puzzle raised
by Bayne and Pacherie (2004,p. 8): “We are also puzzled by the
question of how a top-down account of delusions could explain
the damage to the autonomic system that one finds in the Capgras
and Cotard delusions. Is this caused by the delusional belief?
That seems unlikely.” More generally, top-down accounts don’t
provide a clear picture of how organic malfunction is related to
the cognitive mechanisms that purportedly generate delusions.
Furthermore, if introspective or narrative capabilities are in
some way undermined by organic damage, as Graham and
Stephens would have it (also Campbell, 2002), it is not clear
why the subject’s delusions would be selectively about certain
topics and not others—that is, why the subject is not delusional
about everything he believes, or why some actions or thoughts are
considered alien, but not others. This has been called the problem
of specificity (Gallagher, 2004, 2007). Pacherie et al. (2006, p. 575)
which it puts us when we truly live at the level of sensation” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012,
p. 249/223). We typically do not live at the level of sensation, however; we are
typically perceivers and agents living in the world. In schizophrenia, this natural
attitude can be disrupted. As Merleau-Ponty suggests, one may find a similar
movement toward the impersonal or pure sensibility in art. Levinas suggests
something similar. Art leaves “the level of perception so as to reinstate sensation”
(Levinas, 2001, p. 85/47); it allows us to “wander about in sensation” and to return
to the “impersonality of the elements” (Levinas, 2001, p. 85–86/47). Merleau-Ponty
attributes these kinds of experiences to Cézanne, who he describes as schizothymic.
Cézanne’s paintings reveal the “base of inhuman nature” that our human agency
hides from us (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 76)—an “unfamiliar” world the experience
of which may lead to an uncomfortable anxiety.
suggest that it remains unsolved. This also seems a problem for
those empiricist (bottom-up) accounts that would explain the
loss of SA solely in terms of a faulty comparator. It may be that
the specificity of delusions depends on a kind of internal logic
that involves the integration or disintegration of selfhood; and a
solution may also depend on conceiving of SA as constituted by a
plurality of factors that include physical and social environmental
elements.
A more hybrid explanation may also address some of
these issues. Two-factor models of delusion combine top-down
and bottom-up accounts and suggest a more central role for
neurological problems. The first factor consists of an anomalous
experience, such as an odd feeling (or lack of appropriate
feeling), anomalous perception, or hallucination caused by some
neurological dysfunction that interferes with SA or with some
emotional aspect of experience; the second factor consists of
an attempt to explain or rationalize the anomalous experience,
leading to what the DSM-5 defines as “fixed beliefs that are not
amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence” (see, e.g.,
Ellis and Young, 1990; Davies et al., 2001; Garety et al., 2001).
On some views, experience itself is considered delusional, while
higher-order cognition simply reports (endorses and, as things
develop, perhaps enhances) the delusion (see e.g., Hohwy and
Rosenberg, 2005; Mundale and Gallagher, 2009).
Not everyone agrees, however, that the experience or
judgment about agency is the thing at stake in delusions of
control and thought insertion. Bortolotti and Broome (2009), for
example, deny that delusions of control and thought insertion
involve problems of SA or AA. Rather, they propose that such
delusions involve problems with AO, attributions of ownership.
They view this as a “more demanding notion of ownership”
that involves a self-ascription condition by which a subject
acknowledges an action or thought as her own and ascribes it
to herself on the basis of introspection, or her reasons (or lack
of reasons) for acting or thinking in that way. That there may
be a problem with AO in such cases, however, does not rule
out the possibility that the primary problem is still a problem
with SA. If we ask why the subject reflectively disowns the
action or the thought, two answers still seem possible. Either
(1) the thought doesn’t fit with her self-narrative (as suggested
by Graham and Stephens), and is not “endorsed” by the subject
since she is not able to provide reasons for it (as suggested by
Bortolotti and Broome), or, (2) the action or thought actually
feels or is experienced as alien—a first-order experience that may
have initially motivated the second-order reflection. This type
of first-order experience, even in the case of thought insertion
may involve bodily and spatial aspects, as when patients describe
thoughts entering into their heads literally at certain locations
on their skulls (e.g., Cahill and Frith, 1996). Moreover, this first-
order feeling of alienation may result from, or may result in, a
modulation or displacement of SA for that action or thought. So,
even if Bortolotti and Broome are right that the person’s second-
order, retrospective report indicates a problem with AO, this
problem may be due to a first-order, experiential problem with
SA and/or feeling of alienation (Gallagher, 2015).
Billon (2013), who also thinks that thought insertion involves
problems with AO, provides a different argument against the
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SA explanation. He argues that the subject doesn’t actually have
a first-order experience of the thought. Rather, the inserted
thought is generated and inserted by the second-order reflection.
Such thoughts lack first-order (pre-reflective) phenomenality and
therefore there can’t be a first-order SA or SO for the thought.
Even if one were to accept this account, however, the problem
is still one that involves SA. What does it mean to be able
to come upon a thought that is in itself unconscious (without
phenomenal properties) and for that reason, seemingly not mine?
Billon’s analogy is that the inserted thought is “akin” to a sentence
uttered by someone else, or in a text that one is reading. I may
have reflective access to the thought in a way that is akin to my
perceptual awareness of a sentence on the page or of the sentence
you just uttered. There may be something it is like to have that
reflective access, or to perceive the sentence, but the sentence,
does not have anything like a thought-like phenomenal character.
I come upon a certain intentional content, a certain thought-
meaning that seems independent of any process of thinking that
would bestow on it a phenomenal feeling such that it would feel
like I was the one thinking it. In that case it’s a thought that I
seemingly did not think—something that did not get generated
in my thinking process. But if what’s missing is the sense that
I am the one generating the thought in a process of thinking,
then what’s missing is precisely the sense of self-agency—the pre-
reflective SA which just is the sense that I am the generator of the
thought or action.
The analyses of Bortolotti and Broome and Billon suggest
again the complexity and ambiguity involved in these issues—
that is, the complexity and ambiguity involved in the actual
relations that exist among SA, SO, AA, and AO. It’s possible that
SA and SO are closely related on the prereflective experiential
level of ipseity (consistent with an ipseity-disturbance model—
Parnas and Sass, 2011; Sass, 2014) even if they are not correlated
to the same neural activations (Tsakiris et al., 2010); and it’s also
possible that there are reciprocal relations between SA/SO and
reflective judgments (AA and AO) about agency and ownership
so that modulations run in both directions. If, for example, SA is
disrupted by neural or extra-neural factors, both AO and AAmay
be affected such that I am led to judge an action or thought as
not mine or as not under my control. This ambiguity is reflected
in the various explanations of schizophrenic delusions of control
and thought insertion.
LOSS OF CONTROL IN AGORAPHOBIC
ANXIETY
The experience of agoraphobic anxiety presents us with an
interesting counterpart to that of schizophrenia. If schizophrenia
tends to involve a disruption in SA, which may also involve a
disruption in AO, such that one experiences “a disturbance in the
ownership of one’s body, thoughts and actions, accompanied by
faulty self-monitoring” (Park and Nasrallah, 2014, p. 1), then in
the case of anxiety, the disruption in agency may play a different
role. Unlike schizophrenia, which can entail a “severe erosion
of minimal self-experience or real confusion of self and other”
(Sass, 2014, p. 5), in cases of agoraphobic anxiety, the boundary
between self and other tends to be retained. Indeed, it is precisely
because this boundary is retained rather than destroyed that
anxiety and a loss of control emerges. In this section, we attend to
this loss of control in and through the experience of the anxiety as
it relates to agoraphobia. Our intention in this section is to further
underscore our view that dimensions of agency and ownership
are intertwined, and always situated within both a subjective
and intersubjective context. Our secondary aim is to consider
the points of convergence and divergence between agoraphobic
anxiety and schizophrenia.
Agoraphobia presents us with an especially clear (and often
striking) sense of how a disruption in agency can lead to a
disruption in a sense of self more broadly. This is clear in
at least two ways. In the first case, the anxiety specific to
agoraphobia often involves a disturbance in bodily motricity,
such that sensations of anxiety, including the inability to move
or the sudden urge to move, is felt as if it comes from nowhere.
In the second case, the body of the agoraphobic person is
often presented as a distinct thing in the world rather than a
center of agentive selfhood or a body-as-subject, thus disturbing
SO, or more precisely, the felt sense of bodily ownership.
Together, we consolidate these aspects under the heading of
the bodily-inhibition model of anxiety. Such a model allows
us to see that what is at stake in agoraphobic anxiety is not
simply the discomfort of physical sensations or symptoms, but
instead the threat these symptoms pose to the integrity of self
and self-agency. To defend this claim, we begin by detailing
the agoraphobic condition before considering its conceptual
implications for an understanding of agency.
In clinical terms, agoraphobia tends to be characterized by
symptoms such as heart palpations, trembling of the legs, nausea,
social discomfort, fear of losing control, a sense of impending
doom, and an alienation from the body. Etymologically,
agoraphobia is situated in relation to public spaces the word
stems from agora (Greek for marketplace) and phobia (from the
Greek word phobos meaning flight or terror) (Goldstein and
Chambless, 1982). According to Carl Westphal, the originator
of the term “agoraphobia,” the anxiety experienced during an
attack of agoraphobia was often alleviated when the agoraphobic
person was accompanied by a trusted companion, was slightly
intoxicated, or was able to use a “prop” tomove around the world,
such as a stick or an umbrella (Knapp, 1988).
In causal terms, Westphal accented a fault in thinking,
remarking that, the problem is “more in the head than in the
area of the heart” (p. 60). From the perspective of a cognitive
model, the idea is that our thinking is at fault, specifically
thinking orientated toward dangers in the surrounding world.
According to this model, three stages can be mapped out, each
of which delineates the development of agoraphobia (Clark,
1988). In the first stage, a subject perceives a threat in the
environment, which seems more dangerous than it actually is in
objective terms. This environmental danger can also be reflected
in bodily sensations. Thus, where panic based agoraphobia is
concerned, the tendency to perceive threats in the environment is
transferred to a “misinterpretation” of specific bodily sensations,
in which those sensations are regarded as signals of impending
disaster (Clark, 1988). Such sensations include the sense of
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impending collapse, a loss of control, an anxiety over passing
out, and a more generalized anxiety over “losing one’s mind”
(Barlow, 2002, p. 107). In the second stage, once these sensations
become marked as a focal point in a subject’s experience, an
adjoining coping and behavioral mechanism forms, which is
orientated toward the avoidance of places that arouse undesirable
sensations. Thereafter, a vigilant mode of anticipating both the
onset of anxiety and possible “threats” becomes a defining feature
of the agoraphobic person’s world. In the final stage, to counter
these threats, avoidance behavior becomes habitual, a way of
organizing both the social and spatial dimensions of a subject’s
world, such that the chance of experiencing panic or anxiety is
minimized. Of course, this “mastery” over anxiety comes at the
expense of the subject’s freedom and an experienced loss of SA.
In this respect, Isaac Marks provides a succinct account of the
development of agoraphobia: “Once she cannot get off an express
train, as soon as anxiety starts she will restrict herself to local
trains; when these, too, become the setting for anxiety she retreats
to buses, then to walking, then to going only a few yards from
home, until finally she becomes unable to proceed beyond the
front gate without a companion” (Marks, 1987, p. 336). What
starts out as taking action to restrict one’s actions in certain places
and contexts, ends up in a feeling that one cannot take action at
all in those places and contexts.
Prima facie this cognitive model of the development of
agoraphobia suggests that it can be efficiently treated by cognitive
oriented behavioral therapy (CBT) (Meyer and Gelder, 1963,
p. 19). One reason for the relevance of CBT is that symptoms
of agoraphobia present themselves as discrete events in what
is often otherwise a functional existence. Using CBT, patients
are educated about the physiological processes that give rise to
an acute sense of anxiety. Once the subject “accepts” that their
anxiety is a misinterpretation of perceived danger, “the secretion
of adrenaline” is diminished thanks to a “cognitive restructuring”
(Aslam, 2012)6. This suggests that, in contrast to schizophrenia,
the subject may be able to reflectively alter his belief structure and
adjust his behavior. The person with schizophrenic delusions,
according to the DSM, holds fixed beliefs that are not amenable
to change in light of reflectively considering evidence to the
contrary. CBT treatment of agoraphobia is often implemented
alongside exposure therapy, where the patient is encouraged to
desensitize themselves to places and situations that are liable to
invoke and provoke anxiety (Edelman and Chambless, 1993).
Patients are then asked to repeat the procedure in order to
facilitate and expedite the desensitization process, until the
patient is entirely acclimatized to the fact that the places originally
thought of as terrifying are, in reality, devoid of danger. As a
result, the patient is able to inhabit the world without the sense of
impending collapse previously associated with venturing outside
the home.
Recent studies have focused on identifying the neural
correlates of agoraphobia with the intention of predicting
6The idea that this is a cognitive restructuring which involves a change in beliefs
may suggest a response to Bayne and Pacherie’s (2007) question about how a
belief might be related to changes in ANS. This, as well as the exposure therapy
mentioned below, suggests that the C and the B in CBT are not separable, but, at
the very least, and consistent with concepts of embodied cognition, integrated.
treatment response to CBT (e.g., Lueken et al., 2013; Hahn
et al., 2015). In contrast to clinical descriptions of a dynamic
development of symptoms over time, involving space perception,
specific bodily sensations, loss of control, avoidance of certain
environments, and the forming of behavioral habits, however,
neuroscientific approaches offer snapshot pictures (literally
showing photos of typical agoraphobic situations to patients in
fMRI) of neural activations, namely hyperactivation of the ventral
striatum, insula, amygdala, and hippocampal areas (Wittmann
et al., 2011, 2014).
Although contributing to treatment and an explanation of
agoraphobia, CBT, along with the correlated neuroscience tend
to treat the subject and her surroundings in purely mechanical-
causal terms. This is problematic in at least two respects. First,
no attention is given to the way in which (inter)subjectivity
and spatiality are co-constitutively organized and formed in a
meaningful fashion. To the contrary, spatiality is thought of
as being a largely neutral canvas, an already formed container,
against which the agoraphobic person needs to restructure their
way of thinking (Martin and Dahlen, 2005). Second, the lack
of attention to the lived experience of spatiality fails to capture
the pervasive importance a loss of SA and SO plays in the
development of agoraphobic anxiety. Spatiality, for example,
is understood as a mere background, which provokes and
stimulates an anxiety and sense of panic that ultimately derives
from the subject’s misinterpretation of the world (Gloster et al.,
2013). This overlooks both the rich and relational way in which
anxiety is formed, and also fails to consider that the “disorder”
involved in agoraphobia involves as much a disorder in spatial
experience (or the experience of space as an action space), as a
disorder in the SA.
A phenomenological approach to agoraphobic anxiety is
helpful here in attending to these oversights (Trigg, 2013a,b,
2016a, in press). As is evident in the preceding analysis of
schizophrenia, a phenomenological perspective on anomalous
experience reveals not only that SA and SO are integral to a
sense of self, but also that a disruption in both SA and AO is
not simply an intra-corporeal or intra-psychic occurrence, but
instead involves a certain dynamical structure that includes brain,
body, and physical and social environments. As such, disruption
in SA is not a localized event, but is instead taken up in a
disturbance of selfhood more broadly. In the section that follows,
we will frame this understanding in terms of the bodily-inhibition
model of anxiety.
In non-pathological experiences of subjectivity, we experience
ourselves for the most part as unified agents. That is to say,
we have a prereflective sense of ourselves as both the cause of
our bodily movement and also a prereflective sense of being
the subject of those movements. Furthermore, in everyday
existence SA and SO cohere. As we have seen in the case of
schizophrenia, this coincidence of agency and ownership is not
absolute. Agoraphobic anxiety affords us another inroad to see SA
and SO as integral to understanding both a loss of control and the
related disturbance of selfhood. Indeed, in the clinical literature,
disturbances of agency, selfhood, and control are presented as
being interdependently related. “Agoraphobia,” so Capps and
Ochs writes, “is intimately tied to a deep sense of the absence of
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control over one’s feelings and actions” (Capps and Ochs, 1997, p.
152). Likewise, Barlow writes of the “core of anxiety” as involving
“the sense of a lack of control” (Barlow, 2002, p. xiii). This loss of
control in cases of agoraphobic anxiety is evident in at least two
ways: Bodily motricity and bodily objectification.
“Bodily motricity” refers to the body’s action-oriented power
to project intention into the world in a movement of spontaneity
and possibility (Merleau-Ponty, 2012). In this regard it is,
from a phenomenological perspective, the general source of
SA. Normally we move through the world without significant
obstruction. Our bodily experiences and our sense of self
cohere, such that we have a prereflective sense that the
body as agentive, rather than as “an assemblage of organs
juxtaposed in space.” This agentive body is an “indivisible
possession,” united and integrated (Merleau-Ponty, 2012,p.
100). In most cases, this capacity of our bodily existence
allows us to be situated in the world without the need for
reflective or abstract thought. Moreover, in normal instances
of bodily action, the spatiality of the world is not divided
and dissected into fragmented parts, but instead unfolds in
uniform with the synthesis of the body; that is, as a whole.
In this respect, background and foreground do not form a
binary division, but instead unfold and overlap with one another
(p. 113). The result of the body’s motricity is that our body
operates according to a certain logic, which, whilst not always
available to us in reflection, nevertheless serves to underscore a
temporal and spatial unity operational “beneath intelligence and
perception” (p. 137).
In its everyday motricity the body tends to efface itself,
remaining tacitly in the background (Gallagher, 1986; Leder,
1990). This is not an indication of its insignificance, but a
marker of its irreducible cohesion and integrity. At the same
time the body is an object that we can reflect upon. At times,
this reflective stance on the body is employed in a self-conscious
manner, such as when I am injured and assess the wound in
a critical manner (Legrand, 2007). At other times, my body
becomes an object for me against my own volition, such as
when I am ill and feel my body as an impediment to my
existence. On other occasions, I might experience a broader
alienation from my body, such as when I see a photo of myself
and fail to identify with the subject captured in the frame.
In these moments, we may well have an experience of the
body as somehow distinct, other, or thinglike (Merleau-Ponty,
1965, p. 209). That the body appears for me as different or
even alien does not, of course, attest to substance dualism.
Rather, the body’s apparent distinction is maintained as a
certain affective relation I have to my body. In general, these
movements of self-alienation and bodily objectification are brief,
and are often consolidated into a unified and relatively coherent
sense of self that includes SA and SO, which accompanies us
throughout the contingences and ambiguities of our perceptual
existence.
Agoraphobia provides us with a different story of themotricity
and objectification of the body. In distinction to the normal
experience of spatiality and SA, where the body provides a
forward-looking I can, a trustworthy center of orientation
actively engaged with the affordances that surround it, the
agoraphobic person’s bodily experience of space and agency
is marked by hesitancy, disquiet, and a lack of trust in how
he or she will respond to an unpredictable or unfamiliar
situation (Trigg, 2016a). If the subject is able to move in the
world, then it is thanks only to the construction of a rigidly
established set of habits and patterns. By way of an illustration,
consider several of the motifs appearing in Westphal’s case
studies: “He cannot visit the zoo in Charlottenburg, because
there are no houses” (Knapp, 1988, p. 60); “When in the
company of a friend—he then experiences no fear of crossing
spaces ... The crossing of spaces becomes easier when he
stays next to a moving vehicle” (p. 66); “A cane or umbrella
in his hand often makes the crossing easier” (p. 70). These
examples reveal the highly structured and always conditional
way in which people prone to agoraphobia move through the
world. Lacking the freedom and agency often taken for granted
in bodily existence, the subject has a tendency to rely on a
proximity to familiar objects (the home), a means of escape
(the car), or a prop employed to forge a spatiality of his or
her own (the cane). In each case, the inevitable failure to
maintain this tightly woven yet precarious grip on control
leads to anxiety. When anxiety emerges, then it does so in the
form of what we are calling bodily inhibition, and with it a
diminished SA.
THE BODILY-INHIBITION MODEL OF
ANXIETY
In the notion of bodily inhibition, we include two components
central to agoraphobic anxiety: A diminishment or disruption in
SA and a partial disruption in SO.Wemaintain that each of these
components leads to a broader destabilization in the integrity of
selfhood. Moreover, there is evidently a circular relation between
(i) anxiety causing a disruption in SA and SO, and (ii) further
anxiety being provoked by the loss of SA.
In cases of agoraphobia, anxiety not only causes disruptions
in SA and SO, but also exacerbates existing anxiety conditions.
This is clear in at least two ways. First, the disruption in SA is
related to a shift in bodily motricity. The agoraphobic person’s
hesitant or inhibited movement in the world often involves an
adjoining awareness that anxious sensations and movements
originate less from the agent as an integral and unified subject,
andmore from the body as an autonomous thing (which involves
a modulation of SO). As a result, the subject experiences the
onset of anxiety (and thus the inhibition of the body) as if
coming from nowhere and without any apparent rationale, as
Westphal reports on one case study: “He is absolutely unable to
offer a specific reason for his feeling of anxiety; it is just there
despite all reasoning” (p. 66). Westphal goes on to mention that
in all cases “[the patients] absolutely do not know the reasons
for this fear. It comes by itself; a sudden occurring, strange
thing” (p. 73). The absence of reason explaining the behavior
of the agoraphobic person has a critical outcome: She or he
experiences the inhibition of movement as being caused by the
body as a thing rather than as an agentive center of subjectivity.
A pattern can be mapped accordingly: (i) sensations of anxiety
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are experienced as if deriving from nowhere, disrupting agentive
self-identification; (ii) the resultant consequence is that patients
experience the affected body as not entirely their own; (iii)
finally, this partial (but never absolute) loss of SO entails a more
generalized disturbance in selfhood.
In such cases, as a thing divorced from self-experience (lacking
SO), the body is often presented as having a certain degree
of autonomy. Such a body can only be “trusted” in certain
situations, and it is for this reason that subjects who often
speak of an anxiety over loss of control [as when they fear
“becom(ing) crazed and, in panic, jump(ing) over the rail”
to a drop below] often invoke the body as having autonomy
from the self (Goldstein and Chambless, 1982, p. 131). The
American composer and sufferer of agoraphobia Allen Shawn
writes as follows of the experience of coming to a standstill
when faced with an open space: “If you are very attuned to
sensations in your legs, you will notice that they seem to have
a mind of their own.... The flight impulse is felt keenly in
the legs; it feels almost as if your very limbs were demanding
that you run” (Shawn, 2008, p. 119). Here, we have a striking
example of the concordance between a lack of bodily motricity
(disruption in SA) and bodily objectification (disruption in
SO), such that inhibition in movement results in an alienation
from the body and the body’s potential action. In cases of
agoraphobic anxiety, it is not that I am the one running from
danger, but rather it is the legs that are instructing me to run.
In coming to standstill on a road exposed to wide fields, the
legs present themselves as discernible “things” in the world,
impeding the experience of the body as “one’s own.” In this case
the SO for the legs and for the resulting action is disturbed.
As bodily motricity ceases to be an I can and instead becomes
an I cannot, so the body becomes partially distinct from the
self.
The body that is inhibited by anxiety is a body that
renders SO ambiguous. Whilst there is no doubt that it
is I who am undergoing and enduring the experience of
agoraphobic anxiety, there is nevertheless a parallel uncertainty
as to what extent the body and its actions are irreducibly
mine. In the case of Shawn’s illustration, if the body as a
whole remains constitutive of his sense of self, then the legs
simultaneously contest this sense; neither entirely disowned nor
owned; individual body parts instead assume an uncanny quality
reflective of a broader disintegration of self during anxiety (Trigg,
2014).
ANXIETY, INTERSUBJECTIVITY, AND
SENSE OF SELF
The phenomenological analysis of schizophrenic self-
experience—the conception of ipseity-disturbance as central
to the schizoid pathologies—is instructive in shedding light
on disturbances in agoraphobic anxiety In effect, there are
close parallels to be drawn between the ipseity-disturbance
model of schizophrenia and what we are calling the bodily-
inhibition model of anxiety. Both models involve a heightened
self-reflexivity (hyperreflexivity), in which things that are
normally taken-for-granted—not least the body’s physiological
processes—become focal points of attention. In cases of
agoraphobic anxiety, this self-reflexivity can be framed as a
constant vigilance toward unfamiliar bodily sensations (Trigg,
2016a).
For the sake of the present paper, we are focusing on
similarities between schizophrenia and agoraphobic anxiety.
Nevertheless, there are also clear qualitative differences between
these models. One such difference concerns the temporal
structure of these disorders. As understood from the ipseity-
disturbancemodel, the difference between cases of schizophrenia
and agoraphobic anxiety concerns the temporality involved in
the diminishment of self-awareness. If schizophrenia involves
the sustained diminishment of a “sense of basic self-presence,
the implicit sense of existing as a vital and self-possessed
subject of awareness” (Sass and Parnas, 2003, p. 428), in
cases of agoraphobic anxiety, this diminishment in self-
presence is momentary. The rhythm of agoraphobia is neither
homogenous nor uniform, but instead punctuated by moments
of bodily integrity, spatial coherence, and self-presence alongside
moments of bodily disintegration, spatial incoherence, and
self-alienation. Indeed, it is precisely for these reasons that
the agoraphobic person divides space into safe/danger and
familiar/unfamiliar regions. So long as dangerous and unfamiliar
spaces can be avoided, the subject can function in a “normal”
fashion.
The idea that the “normal” or healthy self is contemporary
with the agoraphobic self is instructive. Of one patient, Westphal
notes, “with the exception of (being unable to cross open spaces
without anxiety), he likes to believe he is healthy” (Knapp, 1988,
p. 63). Likewise, speaking of being in “secure surroundings,”
Shawn reflects on how he feels himself to be “normal”: “I even
pretend to myself that my ‘personality’ is somehow incompatible
with agoraphobia.... Agoraphobia is at odds with the tone of
some of what I do. I am not wary in every domain” (p. 119–
120). Shawn’s “normal” personality is the one able to assume the
role of a performing pianist, able to face a “hostile audience,”
courageous enough to posit a “minority view” at a faculty
meeting, and tolerant of “good and bad reviews” of his work
(p. 120). Moreover, the “normal” articulation of selfhood is one
that is able to circumnavigate the dense but familiar streets of
Manhattan without the incursion of anxiety. This “normal” self,
then, is precisely defined by a strong sense of being both the
originator and controller of bodily movement (SA) coupled with
a tacit sense that it is I who am undergoing that movement
(SO). Agoraphobia is thus patently at odds with this self-
presentation of agency and ownership given that the condition
is marked by a self-alienation from the body (and thus the
world) brought about by a doubt over who/what is inhibiting
movement.
With this in mind, we can begin to see how the onset
of agoraphobic symptoms marks a broader disturbance in
bodily selfhood. If the spatiality of the world is cut up
into different regions, then something similar in the index
of temporality is true of the body. A person suffering
from agoraphobia tends to treat their body as either owned
when movement is experienced as deriving from the self, or
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otherwise partially disowned when movement feels as though
it is inhibited or caused by the autonomy of the body
itself.
Notably, the dissection of the body and the world into
normal/anxious, owned/disowned, and safe/dangerous
categories extends to intersubjectivity, too. Other people
are present not as innocuous bystanders or incidental aspects
within the world of the agoraphobia, but as constituents in a
sense of self and contributors to a loss of self. In the case of
the former, the role of the “trusted person” assumes a defining
importance in the subject’s ability to traverse space without
anxiety. In the company of the trusted person, there is an
increase in SA. Allen Shawn’s ability to cross a wide-open space
is assisted not simply by the presence of “safety items” (Xanax,
ginger all, and a cell phone) but also by the presence of his
companion, who “coaxes” him with the offer of a kiss as a
“reward” (Shawn, 2008, p. 118). In the same way that the car,
umbrella, and proximity to home serve as “escape routes,” so
the same is true of the trusted person who accompanies the
agoraphobic person in their anxiety. Their presence signals
a familiarity, constancy, and understanding lacking in an
otherwise precarious experience of the world (Trigg, 2013a).
Barlow describes a “safe person” in the following respect: “A safe
person is commonly a significant other whose company enables
the patient to feel more comfortable going places than he or she
can be either alone or with other people. Usually, this person
is considered “safe” because he or she knows about the panic
attacks” (Barlow, 2002, p. 343). Having knowledge of the patient’s
panic attacks not only disarms the efficacy of the panic attack but
also provides a legitimate context to manage anxiety should the
subject be “incapacitated by panic” (p. 343). As a result, in the
company of the trusted other, the agoraphobic person is able to
maintain a stronger SA, and an intact SO, than if he or she were
alone.
Other people do not always assuage the experience of
anxiety; they can also amplify and reinforce an already existing
anxiety and rob the subject of the SO (through a process of
objectification) and thence of SA. Clinical research on the role of
other people in the development of agoraphobic anxiety suggests
that the gaze of other people is a significant factor in precipitating
the onset of panic (cf. Davidson, 2002). Indeed, a heightened
self-consciousness concerning how other people perceive the
subject is consistent with the ongoing desire to maintain the self-
presentation of being a “normal” and “healthy” individual both
to oneself and to others (Vincent, 1919). In this respect, other
people are a critical problem for agoraphobic people. Whereas,
spatial routes and bodily habits can be controlled to some extent
by developing a set of habitual patterns that render perceptual
experience predictable, exerting control over how other people
perceive us remains impossible. In this respect, the very centrality
of the home as the safe place par excellence is predicated on its
function as concealing the look of the other, as Joyce Davidson
notes, “[s]ufferers’ homes are frequently organized to minimize
the fear of the look” (Davidson, 2003, p. 84). Unlike inanimate
props such as cars and umbrellas, other people are not simply
objects for our own use, but also perceive us as objects in the
world (Sartre, 1998). As objectified by the look of the other, the
attempt at maintaining a presentation of being “normal” for the
subject proves contentious. Through the look of the other, the
attempt at concealing anxiety through adhering to a ritualized
and regulated life risks being detected, and in being detected, the
very anxiety that the subject seeks to mask from the world in turn
becomes an object of interrogation for the other person.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have explicated the distinctions and connections
between the prereflective experience and the reflective AA and
ownership, within the context of anomalous bodily experiences
in schizophrenia and agoraphobia. We’ve shown that these
phenomena are more complex and ambiguous than usually
thought, both in terms of their neuronal bases and in terms of
their relations with extra-neural factors. We suggested that in
cases of schizophrenic delusions of control, disruptions in SA at
the level of first-order experience may lead to problems with the
reflective attributions of both agency and ownership. Those who
suffer from such delusions at times experience their thoughts,
actions, and bodily movements as alien and controlled by another
agent.
In the case of agoraphobia, disruptions in SA reveal the
dynamic and relational structure of this condition. In terms
of first-person experience, subjects with phobic anxiety tend to
mistrust their own response to the world, feeling their bodies
could give way at any point, thus positioning the locus of
control outside of selfhood. In such cases, loss of SA leads to a
partial loss of SO for body and bodily action. In the context of
intersubjective relations, for people suffering from agoraphobia,
the encroachment of other people into one’s own space leads to
anxiety, generating an experience of the body as both my own
and not my own concurrently.
The underlying dynamics of these disorders with respect to SA
and SO and how they fit into the pattern of self-experience and its
disruption are different. It’s clear, however, that in both disorders
SA and SO cannot be considered in isolation from one another,
but instead form an interdependent pairing.
We also hope to have shown the relevance of
phenomenological accounts of schizophrenia and agoraphobia,
and that purely causal-mechanistic explanations may not be
able to capture everything of importance in these disorders. In
focusing on disruptions in SA and SO, we have not said enough
about the responses to the significantly alien character of the
experiences. To such experiences there are at least two possible
responses corresponding to the two conditions that we have
discussed: (1) anxiety and a retreating reaction against the alien
nature of the experience, generating temporally intermittent
variations in experience, and in some cases the possibility of
a reflective management; or (2) a response that continues and
builds contact with the alien experience—a following along in
which the subject is drawn into a more permanent delusional
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withdrawal of meaning even as he continues to try to make
sense of it.
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